// the take
EDRSilencer uses the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) API to drop outbound network traffic from EDR agent processes, effectively blinding them without terminating them. It's an offensive security / red team tool for simulating what attackers do after gaining admin access on a Windows host. Not for defenders.
WFP is a legitimate Windows API, so this avoids the kernel driver gymnastics most EDR-bypass tools require — lower risk of crashing the system. The custom FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 implementation that sidesteps CreateFileW is genuinely clever and solves a real problem with EDR self-protection hooks. Clean unblock-by-ID makes cleanup safe in post-exploitation scenarios where you don't want to nuke every filter indiscriminately. Single-file C with a straightforward mingw cross-compile path means it fits easily into a build pipeline.
Process name lists are hardcoded in EDRSilencer.c and require recompilation to update — this is already biting it since the author notes untested EDRs may slip through. Tested only on Windows 10 and Server 2016; no coverage for anything past 2019 where WFP behavior has changed. No persistence mechanism: a reboot or EDR restart brings reporting back immediately. Blocking outbound traffic rather than event generation means a sophisticated EDR with local queuing will catch up the moment the filter drops.
We read the README, the directory tree and a key source file in June 2026. Nobody pays to be listed. How we judge →