// the take
Fix Inventory is an open-source cloud security posture tool that polls AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, Hetzner, Kubernetes and GitHub APIs for resource metadata, normalizes everything into a graph, and lets you query it with a purpose-built language to find misconfigurations and privilege-escalation paths. It's aimed at cloud security and platform engineers who want CSPM/CIEM capability without paying for Wiz, Prisma Cloud or Orca.
The graph model plus real query language is the actual differentiator — you can write a traversal query like 'which S3 buckets can user X write to via IAM' instead of the flat per-resource findings most open CSPM tools give you. It ships pre-built CIS, ISO-27001 and NIS-2 benchmarks runnable with a single CLI command, so you get usable compliance output on day one rather than writing every policy yourself. The collector architecture is cleanly pluggable per provider with a documented example_collector, so adding a new cloud or SaaS source isn't a guessing game. Hourly resource snapshots with per-resource diff/timeline are genuinely useful for 'what changed and when' during an incident, which most inventory tools don't bother to keep.
It runs on ArangoDB for the graph store, which is another stateful system to operate, back up and scale — not a trivial dependency to bolt onto an existing stack. This is the open-core funnel for a commercial SaaS (Fix Security): the graph visualizations and some UI polish are reserved for the paid product, so the OSS path is CLI/query-first with a real learning curve before it pays off. Agentless polling across every account means you're at the mercy of each provider's API rate limits at scale — the project's own docs call out being 'mindful of cloud provider API quotas,' which is a tell that this bites in practice with thousands of accounts. And like any tool in this category, it needs broad read-only credentials across every cloud account to be useful at all, which is a real blast-radius credential you now have to provision, rotate and audit.
We read the README, the directory tree and a key source file in October 2026. Nobody pays to be listed. How we judge →